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１ Introduction
This article is the first of the series in which the effect of temporal
credit-saving policies by the government on the economic welfare of
financial traders is analyzed.
In this first one, I show that, without any shortage of liquidity and
any positive real effect, a temporal credit-saving policy that saves
bankrupt equity traders do not improve the welfare of traders. The
analysis is based on an extension of the３-period general equilibrium
model developed in Geanakoplos（２００２）and Fostel and Geanakoplos
（２００８）. In this model, a bond and an equity are traded by heterogene-
ous risk-neutral traders with an opportunity for leverage. I extend it
by introducing temporal credit-saving policies and analyze their conse-
quences on the economic welfare. The policy considered gives tempo-
rally credits to bankrupt equity traders. The government must fi-
nance the policy by levying taxes in the final period. The detail of the
taxation, who pays how much, depends on the asset holdings in the
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new equilibrium, and the government does not announce it at the
time of the policy implementation in order to maximize its temporal
effect. The implementation of the policy shifts the equilibrium, and the
payment of the equilibrium leverage contract into which equity hold-
ers have entered in the first period is adjusted accordingly. The con-
tent of the equilibrium leverage contract is to pay the worst value of
the equity in the next period, and it is assumed to be maintained un-
der a shift of equilibrium. By this adjustment, the increase of the eq-
uity price in the new equilibrium is paid off entirely to the promise
holders, which works as a built-in compensation to the promise hold-
ers.
I show that, if implemented large enough in size, the policy can“il-
lusionary”improve the welfare of traders at the state the policy is im-
plemented. This improvement is“illusionary”because the tax to fi-
nance the policy cannot be foreseen by traders. I show that, in the fi-
nal period, a group of bond holders are made worse off after paying
the tax. More concretely, those who hold the bond regardless of the
policy end up holding a risky asset whose payoff at the bad state be-
comes significantly lower, and those who are discouraged to hold the
equity by its higher price end up avoiding bankruptcy at the bad
state by sacrificing the payoff at the good state. Especially, if the state
in the final period is bad, only those who are discouraged from holding
the equity by the policy are possible beneficiaries. The policy also fail
to achieve a Pareto optimal equilibrium allocation, since they do not al-
ter the span of the financial market.
The results have two important implications for policy makers.
First, the policy does not make sense if its intention is to improve the
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welfare of traders by revitalizing the equity trading when the bad-
turn of the economy is highly expected in the real side of the market.
When the economy turns out to be bad, not only that a group of bond
holders is hurt, but also the potential beneficiaries of the policies are
restricted to those who are discouraged from holding the equity, ex-
cluding the possibility that the equity holders are better off by a fur-
ther redistribution of wealth without hurting the group of bond hold-
ers more, since the government cannot distinguish an individual bond
holder from others. Secondly, there is no ex-ante ground to implement
the policy since it does not achieve a Pareto optimal allocation, while
there is a way to achieve it by implementing new market trading de-
vices. In Fostel and Geanakoplos（２０１１）, it is shown that introducing
both tranching and naked CDS at the same time makes the financial
market complete. Hence introducing them in the initial period makes
the equilibrium allocation ex-ante Pareto optimal. These points further
imply that, for implementing the policy to make sense, the govern-
ment must intend to save“irresolute”from bankruptcy, whose deci-
sion to hold the equity is heavily influenced by the equity price level,
by discouraging them from holding the equity, or have a conclusive
evidence that the economy will almost surely turn out to be good.
We need to distinguish a temporal credit-saving for those caught in
surprise by an unforeseen economic shock and that for those deliber-
ately bankrupt by holding highly risky assets. In the articles, only the
latter type is analyzed. The former is mainly to ease a very short-run
liquidity shock to an economy in order to avoid chain reaction bank-
ruptcies, and will have a positive welfare effect. The latter is imple-
mented when a downward risk on the payoffs of risky assets is fore-
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seen and some traders of risky assets, such as security companies, in-
vestment banks, and hedge funds, demand it vocally. A deliberate and
sophisticated government will not take an action just for rewarding
those demanding, but will implement the policy if it contributes to an
over-all improvement of social and economic welfare, even if a part of
such an improvement turns out to be an illusionary expectation. It is
this possibility that the analysis in the articles examine.
The articles analyze two types of temporal credit-saving policies.
The first type is to give a credit to bankrupt equity investors, which
is analyzed in this article. The second type is to subsidize the pay-
ment of the promise issued by equity buyers if a bad state occurs in
the next period, which is analyzed in the second article. Both actions
must be financed in the final period. The government aims to bring a
temporal welfare improvement at the state where the policy is imple-
mented, without sacrificing anyone in the end after the cost is covered
by tax. Intuitively, such an objective is hard to be fulfilled since, after
the cost is financed, the total payoff available to traders remains the
same as that without the policy, so the best it can achieve is to re-
cover the allocation without the policy in the final period so that trad-
ers enjoy only an illusionary welfare improvement at the state where
the policy is implemented. The results in the articles show that it is
not possible to recover the original allocation after the tax is levied in
the final period, though it is possible to have an illusionary improve-
ment at the state where the policy is implemented. In other words,
the government can achieve an illusionary welfare improvement only
by sacrificing a real welfare in the future. Also, the results show that
an illusionary welfare improvement at the time of the policy imple-
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mentation can be achieved only if the sizes of the policies are big
enough. This implies that an illusionary welfare improvement requires
a large sacrifice of the real welfare in the future.
A quick glance at the quantity-easing policy in Japan will help mak-
ing a point clear. This policy was implemented in March,２００１. At that
time, both the financial market and the real economy had been stag-
nant with no expectation of recovery in the near future, and the need
to finish the disposal of bad assets mounted after the corruption of the
realty bubble had been advocated vocally. As clarified in Chapter５of
Umeda（２０１１）, the quantity-easing policy had been a topic in the Pol-
icy Board of BOJ from late１９９８ in relation to an inflation target pol-
icy. The majority of the board had been reluctant to implement such a
policy, stating unofficially that the market for short-term bonds main-
tained a sufficient level of liquidity, so that the quantity-easing would
just result in replacing them with inside money, and have no real ef-
fect. However, the Japanese government was determined to take a
move to finish off the disposal of bad assets, and the board had recog-
nized that such a move might cause a new liquidity shock, which lead
to the adoption of the policy. The restructuring of the banking sector
was mostly finished in２００２, but the objective of the policy had been
gradually shifted toward stimulating the real economy, and the board
made a commitment to continue its quantity-easing policy in October,
２００３. The policy had not been lifted until March２００６. The target size
of the current account at BOJ was raised seven times during the pe-
riod of policy installation, grew from the initial０．５ trillion yen in２００１
to max.３．５trillion yen. To achieve this target, BOJ bought short-term
bonds, commercial papers, even stocks and mortgage-backed securi-
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ties from financial institutions. It also bought the long-term govern-
ment bond in order to fill the gap between the target size of the ac-
count and supply of assets by those financial institutions. The empiri-
cal study on the effect of the quantity-easing policy is still ongoing, but
preliminary results show that it is at least hard to observe a positive
real effect, as stated in Chapter１０of Umeda（２０１１）. This implies that
the quantity-easing affected only on the financial market. Arai（２０１２）
finds that, during２００３―２００６, the difference between the lending rate
and deposit rate in the banking sector was steadily decreasing, and
the small stocks, traded mainly in the２nd section of TSE, had bubbled
while the index for the big stocks, traded in the１st section of TSE,
had not moved drastically. The rise of the small stock price index
shows a significant correlation with an index which represents a per-
sistence of the expectation that the quantity-easing policy is sustained,
so it is suspected that the lent money had been used for leverage to fi-
nance an investment to small stocks, as explained in Arai（２０１２）. Also,
the investment to foreign assets became very popular since the quan-
tity-easing policy helped to maintain the near-zero rate on the de-
posit／bond, and the foreign asset markets had offered a much better
look on the return. Though the empirical studies on this matter seem
inconclusive at best, the data used for these studies is too restricted to
capture all of capital movement, and there is a room to suspect that a
big amount of lent money had been used for a foreign investment.
Much of the investment in small stocks and the foreign investment
has turned out to be bad later, and BOJ has returned to the zero-rate
policy in December,２００８. On the part of the cost for the policy, the
Japanese government has continued to spend heavily by issuing long-
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term treasury bonds with a high pace, and most of them had been
bought by the banks in Japan. The treasury is backed by tax, so it
means that a large population of Japanese nationals who choose to
maintain their wealth solely by depositing to commercial banks owe a
large share of the cost for the quantity-easing policy.
The analysis is based on a３-period general equilibrium model, in
that２assets, a bond and an equity, are traded. Traders are assumed
to be risk-neutral, but have different prospects on the possibility of
the bad-turn of the economy. Leverage opportunities are available for
all traders, and the promise issued by equity buyers are traded naked.
Assuming risk neutrality of traders makes all traders except a critical
one hold exactly one type of asset, never mixed. This enables a simple
categorization of traders by their asset holding, and the government
can use this information to set up taxable bases. The model was first
introduced by Geanakoplos（２００２）as an example to a more general
model with leverage opportunities and default. The model was elabo-
rated further in Fostel and Geanakoplos（２００８）, and extended to in-
corporate tranches and CDS, more than３periods, and different uncer-
tainty structures, in Fostel and Geanakoplos（２０１０）and Fostel and
Geanakoplos（２０１１）. The analysis in these papers take a focus on the
equilibrium price dynamics and the resulting credit cycle. In Fostel
and Geanakoplos（２０１２）, the linear pricing formula and the“VAR＝０”
nature of the promise traded in equilibrium is proved to be true with-
out risk neutrality of traders if the one-period uncertainty is binomial.
However, the welfare effect of trading promises has been largely ne-
glected in these researches. A positive effect on the economic welfare
by introducing the possibility of default into a general equilibrium
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model was first found in Dubey et al.（１９９０）and Zame（１９９３）. In
these papers, default is allowed with a pre-specified penalty rate in
terms of utility, which is not observable in the market. This character-
istics makes the evaluation of policy, based on the observation of the
market, impossible. Kaneko（２００６）offers an analysis of economic wel-
fare in a hypothetical trading system with the rate of successful con-
tracting as a sole market variable. Since the temporal credit-saving
policies are implemented in the standard market system, this model
cannot be used to evaluate these policies.
This article is organized as follows. The section ２ describes the
model used in the analysis. The section３reviews an equilibrium with-
out any implementation of the policy, derived in Fostel and Geanak-
oplos（２００８）. The section４describes two types of temporal credit-sav-
ing policies to be analyzed in a series of articles, and the criteria to
evaluate their welfare effects. The adjustment of a financial contract
with a shift of equilibrium is discussed in the section５. The analysis of
the policy is given in the section６. The section７ evaluates the wel-
fare effects of the policy. A conclusion and additional remarks on the
result of this article is given in the section８. Full analysis of a positive
real effect by the policy is given in the appendix.
２ Model
The analysis is based on a simple３ period model, introduced in
Geanakoplos（２００２）to analyze a pro-cyclic behavior of leverage. The
following is the description of its model. The readers who are inter-
ested in the analysis of leverage cycle are referred to Geanakoplos
（２００２）, Fostel and Geanakoplos（２００８）, Fostel and Geanakoplos（２０１０）,
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and Fostel and Geanakoplos（２０１１）. The readers whose focus is on
the pricing of promises are referred to Fostel and Geanakoplos（２０１２）.
The current period is zero, with a unique state s０. In the period１, a
“good”state or a“bad”state may occur. In the“good”state, all un-
certainty in the economy is resolved. In the“bad”state, two states,
again called as a“good”state and a“bad”state, may follow in the pe-
riod２. I call the“bad”state in the period１ s１, the“bad”state in the
period２s２, and the good state in the period２s３. The event tree of the
economy is shown in Figure１.
There is a commodity for consumption traded in spot markets, hid-
den behind the financial economic model by tradition. All market val-
Figure１: Uncertainty of the economy
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ues are measured against the value of the commodity, so that I can
safely assume that the value of the commodity is always１. Note that
there is no real effect derived from nominal values of goods and assets,
since there is no restriction on the market liquidity of goods and as-
sets, which is traditionally the case of general equilibrium models.
There are two assets traded in the market, a bond X and an equity
Y. The bond X is risk-less, while the equity Y has a risk of devaluation
if a“bad”state occurs. In the period２, the payoff of the bond X is１ in
any state, while the equity Y pays１at all states other than s２, where
it pays R＜１.
There is a continuum of traders, distributed uniformly on［０,１］. All
traders are assumed to be risk neutral, but different traders have dif-
ferent subjective probabilities（beliefs）that a“good”state will occur.
The traders are aligned increasingly by the optimism, so there is an
increasing continuous function q :［０,１］→［０,１］such that the subjec-
tive probability of the trader h that a“good”state will occur is the
value of q at h, which I write as qh.
The assumption of risk neutral traders with heterogeneous beliefs is
obviously quite extreme, but works well for analyzing equilibria with
bankruptcy since the traders can bet on their most preferable state so
that they will go bankrupt quite easily. In the analysis, the assumption
makes it easier to identify a group of traders that is the target of a
temporal credit-saving policy.１
At the current state s０, each trader has one bond and one equity.
Hence the total supply of the bond and the equity is１at any states in
the period０and the period１.
The model assumes that traders can take advantage of leverage on
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the equity Y. A leverage is to borrow by promising to pay back later
when buying risky assets. The promise issued for leverage in the bi-
nary uncertainty setting of this model can be expressed as（j, j）,
where j is the amount to pay back in the next period promised by
borrowers. In U.S., the promise is a non-recourse contract so that, if
the gain from holding risky assets with leverage is less than the
amount promised, the borrowers pay only that gain and default the
rest. In Japan, the promise is a recourse contract so that the borrow-
ers must pay the amount they promised regardless of the gain they
receive by holding assets with leverage. Each borrower is allowed to
choose the level of promise when he decide to take advantage of lev-
erage opportunity. Hence, potentially, the model does not exclude the
possibility of multiple levels of promises chosen by traders, and of de-
fault when contracts are non-recourse. However, as Geanakoplos
（２００２）and Fostel and Geanakoplos（２００８）shows, in this simple model,
all traders choose the same level of promise in equilibria, and there is
no default. In Fostel and Geanakoplos（２０１２）, it is proved that this re-
mains to be true without assuming risk-neutrality of traders, if the un-
derlying uncertainty of the economy is structured binomially. Hence,
whether the leverage is recourse or non-recourse does not matter.
The model also assumes that traders cannot take a short position
１ In the real world, such traders are likely to be small future traders and／or
foreign exchange traders, whose influence on the financial market would be
limited at best, compared with that by risk-averse institutional traders.
Hence the correct modeling would be assuming the homogeneous belief
（subjective probabilities are the same）and aligning traders with respect to
the degree of risk aversion, or allowing any combination of a subjective
probability and a degree of risk aversion.
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on either of the bond or the equity. This assumption is not adopted by
the standard financial economics model. Fostel and Geanakoplos
（２０１１）gives an explanation to defend this assumption, but I would
like to give a different line of defense here. It has been shown in the
numerous researches in８０’s and９０’s that the existence of an eco-
nomic equilibrium in a financial economics model requires either that
the trading strategies satisfy a“nice”moment condition（typically a
kind of L２ structure）, or that short sales have a finite bound. The mo-
ment condition to make price-quantity relation as an inner product
may be handy in mathematics, but is purely structural, meaning that
there is no solid justification in terms of traders’economic behavior.
The exclusion of the so-called“Dutch doubling-strategy”without a
bound on short position is achieved by the finiteness of trading oppor-
tunities in discrete-time trading models. However, this finiteness is
just a loose proxy to the real world trading, and the result that solely
depends on this assumption should be taken with a caution. On the
other hand, among others, Hart（１９７５）shows that the possibility of in-
finite short sales destroys the existence of equilibrium. In the real
world trading, the so-called short position in financial assets is attained
only by borrowing from the existing long position, and taking a huge
short position requires a public report, which can be scrutinized later.
In addition, most of trading practices set a hair-cut line at which an
obligation／debt, such as a short position, is forced to clear out. So, as-
suming a finite bound on short position seems natural in economic
analysis. Surely, this bound need not be zero as assumed in this model.
But, if traders are allowed to be short on bonds with a significant
amount, then there is no need of leverage on the equity, the financial
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market is effectively complete, and the welfare analysis becomes quite
obvious. Namely, since the financial market is complete, the equilib-
rium allocation is Pareto optimal, and any credit-saving policies other
than the redistribution of income have a risk of making the allocation
sub-optimal.２
I assume that traders with the same trading strategy are symmet-
ric. All bond buyers at s０, having the same income, purchase the same
amount of the bond-equivalents（X and a non-defaulting promise）. The
same for all equity buyers with leverage at s０. At s１, only bond buyers
at s０ are active, and they have the same income, hence the symmetry
holds again. Assuming the symmetry simplifies the analysis since all
bond／promise buyers have the same income at s１ Namely, the effect
of an equity price increase is uniform among bond／promise holders, so
that there are no relative winners and losers inside this group.
３ Equilibrium Without Temporal Credit-Saving Policy
Geanakoplos（２００２）solves for a unique equilibrium without any pol-
icy implementation in this model. I reproduce its result in order to
give a starting point of my analysis. For a complete proof and an ex-
tension to n-period model with n＞３, see Fostel and Geanakoplos
（２００８）and Fostel and Geanakoplos（２０１０）.
In a unique equilibrium, there are bankrupt traders in the period１
and２. At the state s０, all traders buying the equity Y take advantage
of leverage by issuing the promise equal to the price of the equity at
２ The redistribution of income is just the policy to choose one among Pareto
optimal allocations, but I do not intend to explain who should be saved by
sacrificing others in my analysis, so I do not pursue this line.
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the state s１. There is a trader h＊０ , called as a marginal buyer of the eq-
uity in Geanakoplos（２００２）, such that those in（０, h＊０］buy the bond X
and the promise, while those in（h＊０ ,１］buy the equity with leverage.
The trader h＊０ is indifferent between buying the bond／promise and
buying the equity with leverage. In this article, it is assumed that he
buys the bond／promise. At s１, those who bought the equity at s０ go
bankrupt. They sell all the equity in the market, pay the promise, and
cease to exist as traders. Those who bought the bond／promise con-
tinue to trade. All traders buying the equity take advantage of lever-
age by issuing the promise equal to R. There is a trader h１（h１＜h＊０）
such that traders in［０, h１）buy the bond／promise while those in（h１．
h＊０］buy the equity with leverage. The trader h１ is indifferent between
buying the bond／promise and buying the equity with leverage, and
assumed to buy the bond／promise. In the period２, those who bought
the equity at s１ are bankrupt at s２.
The equilibrium prices and allocations are determined as follows.
Let me denote the price of the equity at sk by p（k）, and the price of
the promise j at sk byπj（k）, where k is either０or１.
At s０:
Take p（１）as given. The only promise issued is j＝p（１）. Since its
payoff is co-linear with that of X, and both of them are traded in
positive amounts, the arbitrage makesπj（０）＝p（１）in equilibria.
The trader h＊０ is indifferent between buying the bond／promise
and buying the equity with leverage, so, the marginal utility of
expenditure on the bond／promise and that on the equity with lev-
erage must be equal. Note that the trader h＊０ will be buying the
equity with leverage at s１, and there the only promise issued is j
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＝R. This implies that the following equation must be satisfiued,
qh＊０（１－p（１））
p（０）－p（１）＝qh
＊
０＋（１－qh＊０）
qh＊０（１－R）
p（１）－R . 
The market clearing condition on Y makes the following equation
being satisfied,
（１－h＊０）１＋p（０）p（０）－p（１）＝１. 
（By the Walras law, the bond market is automatically cleared
once the equity market is cleared.）Solving these two equation for
（h＊０ , p（０））determines them as a function of p（１）.
At s１:
Take（h＊０ , p（０））, a function of p（１）, as given. All traders h∈（h＊０ ,
１］goes bankrupt, selling all Y they have and passing the revenue
to buyers of the promise. All traders h∈［０, h＊０］secure the same
positive income
１＋p（１）
h＊０ , and continue to trade. The only promise
issued is j＝R. Since its payoff is identical to that of X, and both of
them are traded in positive amounts, the arbitrage makesπR（１）＝
R in equilibria. The trader h１ is indifferent between buying the
bond／promise and buying the equity with leverage, so that the
following equation is satisfied,
qh１（１－R）
p（１）－R＝１. 
The market clearing condition on the equity makes the following
equation being satisfied,
（h＊０－h１）１＋p（１）h＊０
１
p（１）－R＝１. 
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Since q is a function of h and（h＊０ , p（０））is a function of p（１）, solv-
ing these two equations for（h１, p（１））determines the equilibrium
values of these variables, and those of（h＊０ , p（０））.
The reason why only one promise is traded and it allows no default,
is based on the comparison of marginal utilities of expenditure on X,
the promise, Y with no leverage, and Y with leverage, for all traders. A
general proof without the assumption of risk-neutrality is given in
Fostel and Geanakoplos（２０１２）.
In this economy, the marginal utility vectors of traders are｛（qh,１－
qh）｝h∈［０，１］. They span R２＋ positively. This means that the equilibrium al-
location is not Pareto optimal unless the financial market is complete
without short sale. The completeness of the financial market is
achieved only when all Arrow securities are available to all traders.
However, at s１, the bond／promise buyers cannot have an access to the
Arrow security on s２ since they cannot short the equity.３
The following argument shows that the equilibrium allocation with-
out temporal credit-saving policies is indeed Pareto suboptimal at s１.
The idea is to allocate two Arrow securities properly to all traders.
The total supply of the Arrow security on s２ is１＋R, while that of the
Arrow security on s３ is２. Note that, in equilibrium, each equity buyer
holds the Arrow security on s３ by the same amount,
１
qh１
１＋p（１）
h＊０ . Con-
struct a new allocation as follows. First, allocate exactly the same
amount of the Arrow security on s３ as that in the equilibrium alloca-
３ On the other hand, the equity buyers have an access to both the Arrow se-
curity on s２ and that on s３, thanks to the opportunity for leverage.
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tion to each trader in（h１, h＊０］. By the market clearing condition on the
equity, this uses up（１－R）of Arrow securities on s３, out of２. Hence
both Arrow securities are available to traders in［０, h１］by the same
amount,（１＋R）. Consider the economy in which two Arrow securities
are traded by the group［０, h１］, where each member is endowed with
１＋R
h１ of both Arrow securities, and obtain a competitive equilibrium of
this economy in which prices of two securities are normalized to sum
up to１. By the market clearing condition on the bond／promise in the
original equilibrium, each trader has the income
１＋p（１）
h＊０ . In the equi-
librium, there exists a trader h′who is indifferent between Arrow se-
curities, all traders in［０, h′）buy the Arrow security on s２, and all
traders in（h′, h１］buy the Arrow security on s３.（The equilibrium
price of the Arrow security on s２ is（１－qh′）, while that of the the Ar-
row security on s３ is qh′.）The competitive equilibrium makes every
one, except h′, better off than holding the endowment. Since the en-
dowment is exactly the bond／promise, it means that this competitive
equilibrium allocation improves the original equilibrium allocation for
the trader group［０, h１］. Hence, by allocating the new equilibrium allo-
cation to［０, h１］, we obtain an allocation in the original economy that
improves the equilibrium allocation at s１.
４ Types of Temporal Credit-Saving Policies
In a series of articles, I consider two types of temporal credit-saving
policies implemented at s１.
Type１Give a positive income symmetrically to each bankrupt trader.
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Type２Promise to pay the difference between the issued promise on
Y and R at s２.
It is assumed that an action by the government does not create a
new credit, so that both policies must be totally backed by tax in the
period２. Both policies are of a temporary nature, and the resource to
finance those increased credits is not made clear, rather deliberately,
at the time the policies are implemented. The government suddenly
collects the cost by levying taxes after all securities pay out and be-
fore the consumption occurs in the period２, based on the observable
characteristics of traders in the financial market. The government
does not announce its tax rule until it is actually enforced. Traders are
fooled since they cannot know how the government will tax them
based on their information available in the market at the time they de-
cide their trading strategies. Traders may expect that they will be
taxed later, but the tax rule will depend on the pools of traders hold-
ing the same security at s１ in an equilibrium, which no trader has an
ability to anticipate before the equilibrium trades actually occur.
How the policies make sense to the financial economy？ It is as-
sumed that the traders are outcome-oriented in the sense that they
regard the government intervention as acceptable if their conceived
utilities are at least not worse off. Namely, if the government can illu-
sionary make them better off at s１ and keep them not worse off after
tax in the period２, these policies will be acceptable, or even wel-
comed.
The Pareto improvement is not enough for a policy to be sound,
however. If the equilibrium allocation after the government interven-
tion is still Pareto suboptimal, some traders will not be satisfied, while
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the others are indifferent. Then a further intervention by the govern-
ment may be demanded by a group of investors collectively. I require
that a satisfactory policy must achieve a Pareto optimal allocation.
This actually means that the policy must recover the completeness of
the financial market.
５ Adjustment of the Equilibrium Financial Contract With a
Shift of Equilibrium
The implementation of polices at s１ triggers a shift of the equilib-
rium afterward. The promise issued by the equity holders at s０ has
not yet paid off at the time of policy implementation, so that the pay-
ment may change according to this shift. This is so since the decision
by equity holders to issue the promise for leverage at s０ has been
based on the common expectation of the equity value at s１, which may
change by the implementation of the policy.
It is not a common economic practice that the nominal value of the
payment is maintained blindly under such a circumstance. The reason
why the equity holders at s０ issued the promise p（１）, among all other
available leverage contracts, was precisely that it was a common
knowledge among traders that p（１）would be the equity price at s１ in
“the”equilibrium. Hence this nominal payment value loses its ground
entirely once it becomes a common knowledge among traders that it
is not the equity price realized at s１, so that traders have no incentive
to carry out the promise“as is”.
Traders face a difficulty to evaluate the payment value since it is si-
multaneously determined with the new equilibrium. If there is enough
time to rearrange the contract through a staged process, both the
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new equilibrium and the new payment are determined subject to the
design of this process. The outcome will create winners and losers
among traders, so that traders are drawn into a competition on the
procedure to design a process of contract rearrangement. The equilib-
rium outcome of this competition will create winners and losers
among traders again, so that they are now drawn into a competition
on a procedure to design a procedure to design a staged process for a
rearrangement of the financial contract. And so on. Such a competi-
tion on procedures may run indefinitely if the time to realize trades in
the market is neglected, or no solution to stop the competition imme-
diately is proposed. The market cannot wait the outcome of rear-
rangement indefinitely, so a solution to end such an infinite sequence
of competitions is called for.
It is somewhat common but not good as an economic practice that
an authority working as a neutral arbitrator other than the market
system, such as a legal arbitration by the court, writes the design of a
staged process for a rearrangement. Such a solution is typically ration-
alized by the bounded rationality of traders, in the sense that no trad-
ers can carry out the computation of rational strategies in a series of
competitions that may run indefinitely. However, that is a grossly mis-
placed use of the notion of the bounded rationality. The market sys-
tem involves all economic agents, including the arbitrator, so that
handing an authority to design the process to this particular economic
agent gives him an outstanding privilege to pursue his economic inter-
est. If he can manage to present various designs, he will be able to
choose one that is most economically beneficial to him. This means
that the bounded rationality of financial traders is used as a threat to
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achieve an enhancement of the position of a particular economic agent
to pursue his economic interest rationally. For example, since the fed-
eral court system is a part of the government in a broad sense, the
economic interest of the arbitrator may be identified with that of pol-
icy makers who create“the”controversy itself. Then, a coalition of
the arbitrator and the policy makers can exploit maximally from finan-
cial traders by proposing an all-or-nothing choice on a package of a fi-
nancial policy and an arbitration process, citing traders’bounded ra-
tionality as a threat. To prevent this to happen, a trade-off in eco-
nomic interest between policy makers and the court must be intro-
duced, which eats up the resources in the broad economy not modeled
in the simple financial model we are working on, and drives down the
market economic welfare. The bounded rationality must be imposed
on all economic agents involved in that market incident, including the
arbitrator and the government, equally, if it is imposed at all.
A realistic solution, which is also sound as an economic practice, is
to maintain the content of the financial contract, not the nominal
value. The equilibium promise issued by the equity holders at s０ is to
pay the least value of the equity price realized in the next period.
When this value changes by a shift of the equilibrium, the payment is
automatically adjusted accordingly. This solution is surely bounded ra-
tional since it cannot be fully rationalized. For example, if the equity
price at s１ rises in the new equilibrium, all equity holders at s０ gain by
sticking to the nominal value of the payment. However, results in the
next section guarantee that the solution can be implemented with the
type１ policy without any cost if the government can make the pay-
ment of the new equilibrium equity price as a precondition to give
千葉大学 経済研究 第２７巻第４号（２０１３年３月）
（６７７） ２１
credits to bankrupt traders. Without the implementation of the policy,
equity holders are sure to go bankrupt so that they have no choice
but to obey. Since the additional credit is given to them simultane-
ously with the execution of trades in the market, it is impossible for
the traders to receive the credit first by pretending to obey and de-
fault the difference to the nominal value if it is positive. We actually
will see that the equity price rises in the new equilibrium. Hence, not
only equity holders but also bond holders gain in their temporary in-
come at s１. We will also see that the government is also satisfied since
more traders end up holding bond／promise so that it can increase a
taxable base in the period２. Hence no economic agent loses tempo-
rary at s１. On the other hand, with the type２policy, in order to imple-
ment the solution, it is necessary to clear the market account of bank-
rupt traders using the nominal value of the promise first, and pool its
total amount for the final payment to the promise holders, before the
policy is implemented. Otherwise the equity traders will refuse to pay
more than the nominal value on their promises, since they know that
they are not saved by the policy. Hence, presumably, implementing
the solution with the type２policy would incur a social cost.
In the following analysis, it is assumed that the solution to maintain
the content of financial contracts under a shift of equilibrium is imple-
mented in the financial economy without any cost. The assumption
maximizes the room for a temporary improvement of the economic
welfare under the policy, so that a negative result with this assump-
tion means that the policy is not worth implementing.
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６ Welfare Effect of the Type１Temporal Credit-Saving Policy
In this section, the model is solved for an equilibrium when the tem-
poral credit-saving policy of type１ is implemented, and evaluated in
terms of economic welfare.
Let M be the total amount of credit the government gives equally to
bankrupt traders at s１. Since the model does not have money, this is
achieved by an increase of the bond supply by M, and and distributing
them to the bankrupt traders as endowments.
Each equity holder h in（h＊,１］now has a positive income M
１－h＊０ at
s１. The income of each bond／promise holder h in［０, h＊０］is also in-
creased. These traders have equal amount of promises issued at s０.
The assumption made earlier says, though the promise is denoted as
p（１）mathematically without the policy, it actually promises the worst
value of the equity in the period１. Since some equity holders, now
with positive incomes, will continue to hold the equity, the new equi-
librium equity price p＊（１）will be higher than p（１）. So, the promise
now pays p＊（１）, which is higher than the original payment p（１）.
Therefore, each bond trader h in［０, h＊］has the income１＋p
＊（１）
h＊０ , in-
creased from the original
１＋p（１）
h＊０ .
Let’s denote the promise at s１ used for leverage by equity traders
as j, where j∈［０,１］. The promise j pays the amount min（j, R）at s２
and j at s３. Letπ（j）be the price of the promise j.
Let h＊１ be such that p＊（１）＝qh＊１ ＋（１－qh＊１）R. By solving for qh＊１ ,
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qh＊１＝
p＊（１）－R
１－R . The trader h
＊
１ is the marginal buyer of the equity with
the policy.
For each trader h, the marginal utility of expenditure on the equity
with leverage is
qh（１－j）＋（１－qh）max（R－j，０）
p＊（１）－π（j） , that on the equity
without leverage is
qh＋（１－qh）R
p＊（１） , that on the promise j is
qh j＋（１－qh）min（j，R）
π（j） , and that on the bond is１. A comparison on
these marginal utilities of expenditure and the no-arbitrage in
equilibria show a key observation, that only the promise R is traded in
equilibrium, all h∈［０, h＊１］buy the bond and the promise, and all h∈
（h＊１ ,１］buy the equity with leverage. The result is the same as that in
Geanakoplos（２００２）, since the wealth level of a trader do not affect his
marginal utility of expenditure, by the assumption that traders are
risk neutral. It is also a trivial application of the general result in Fos-
tel and Geanakoplos（２０１２）.
To determine an equilibrium, we need to calculate h＊１ and p＊（１）.
They are determine by two equations, one is the definition of h＊１ , the
other is the market clearing condition on either the equity Y or the
bond and the promise R. By the Walras law, one of the market clear-
ing condition is redundant, so that we have two equations to deter-
mine two unknowns.
For the market clearing condition, since traders in［０, h＊０］and trad-
ers in（h＊０ ,１］have different incomes, there are two cases to be con-
sidered. One is the case h＊１＜－h
＊
０ , the other is the case h＊１＞h＊０ . In the
former case, all bond／promise buyers have the same income, while the
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equity buyers include all equity buyers at s０who are saved by the pol-
icy. In this case, the market clearing condition on the bond／promise is
h＊１（１＋p
＊（１）
h＊０ ）＝１＋M＋R,
while the market clearing condition on the equity is
M＋（h＊０－h＊１）（１＋p
＊（１）
h＊０ ）＝p＊（１）－R.
In the latter case, all equity traders are those saved by the policy,
while the bond traders are mixed. In this case, the market clearing
condition on the bond／promise is
１＋p＊（１）＋（h＊１－h＊０）（ M１－h＊０）＝１＋M＋R,
while the market clearing condition on the equity is
（１－h＊１）（ M１－h＊０）＝p＊（１）－R.
By solving for p＊（１）and qh＊１ , we have the following system of equa-
tions.
When h＊１＜－h
＊
０ :







qh＊１＝
１
１－R［
h＊０（１＋M＋R）
h＊１ －（１＋R）］,
p＊（１）＝h
＊
０（１＋M＋R）
h＊１ －１.
When h＊１＞h＊０ :







qh＊１＝
１
１－R［
１－h＊１
１－h＊０ M］,
p＊（１）＝１－h
＊
１
１－h＊０ M＋R.
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Note that, in both cases, the r.h.s. of the equation for qh＊１ is increasing
with respect to M and decreasing with respect to h＊１ . Since q is in-
creasing, this implies that the equation has at most one solution, and
that the solution h＊１ is increasing with respect to M. Obviously, if M＝０,
then the solution coincides with that without policy, h１. Since p＊（１）＝
qh＊１（１－R）＋R, p＊（１）is increasing with respect to M. Note that h＊１＝
h＊０ if and only if qh＊０＝ M１－R and that p
＊（１）＝M＋R in this case. There-
fore,
M
＜
＝
＞
（１－R）qh＊０⇔h＊１
＜
＝
＞
h＊０ .
Now I analyze the welfare effect of the policy. I calculate in two dif-
ferent cases, separately.
Case１:０＜M＜（１－R）qh＊０
First, I calculate expected utilities achieved by traders condi-
tional on the occurrence of s１, and compare them with those with-
out policy. Note that h１＜h＊１＜h＊０ in this case. The result is sum-
marized in Table１.
For h＜－h１, the conditional expected utility is increased simply
because they are bond holders regardless of the policy, and their
income is increased. For h∈（h＊０ ,１］, it is also increased simply be-
cause any opportunity of trading is better than bankruptcy.
For h∈（h＊１ , h＊０］, the ratio of the conditional expected utility
with policy to that without policy is,
（１＋R１－R）
１
qh＊１
＋１
（１＋R１－R）
１
qh１
＋１
＜１.
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Therefore their conditional expected utilities are decreased by
the policy.
For h∈（h１, h＊１］, the ratio of the conditional expected utility
without the policy to that with the policy is,
qh
qh１


１＋R
１－R＋qh１
１＋R
１－R＋qh
＊
１


.
The ratio is clearly continuous and increasing with respect to h.
Since qh１＜qh＊１ , the ratio is less than１when h＝h１ and more than１
when h＝h＊１ . Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, there ex-
ists a h′１∈（h１, h＊１）such that the conditional expected utility for
the trader h′１ remains the same after the introduction of the pol-
icy. For h∈（h１, h′１）, the conditional expected utility is increased
by the policy, while it is decreased by the policy for h∈（h′１, h＊１）.
The interval（h′１, h＊０）constitutes an open neighborhood of h＊１ .
So, we can say that there is a neighborhood of h＊１ such that tem-
Table１: A comparison of expected utilities when M＜（１－R）qh ＊０
Trader Group
Security Holding
w.o. policy→w. policy
E.U. at s１
w. Policy
E.U. at s１
w.o. Policy
［０, h１］ Bond→Bond １＋p
＊（１）
h＊０
１＋p（１）
h＊０
（h１, h＊１］ Equity→Bond １＋p
＊（１）
h＊０
qh
qh１
１＋p（１）
h＊０
（h＊１ , h＊０］ Equity→Equity qhqh＊１
１＋p＊（１）
h＊０
qh
qh１
１＋p（１）
h＊０
（h＊０ ,１］ Equity→Equity qhqh＊１
M
１－h＊０ ０（bankrupt）
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porary welfare of traders in it is made worse by the temporal
credit-saving policy of the type１. The economic intuition for this
result is quite clear. These traders were bond／promise buyers at
s０, and would be sufficiently willing to buy the equity with lever-
age at s１ if the policy was not implemented. The incentive to do
so would be given by the lowered price of the equity by the bad
news, which would improve the marginal utility of expenditure on
the equity with leverage. But, the policy makes the equity price
higher, so the marginal utility of expenditure on the equity is low-
ered. By the definition of h′１, all traders in（h′１, h＊０］are improved
by buying the bond／promise with the policy, and it is the best
choice for them. For h∈（h＊１ , h＊０］, buying the equity with leverage
is still better, but the marginal utility of expenditure on the eq-
uity is lowered compared with that without the policy. Note that
the argument includes a positive effect on the conditional ex-
pected utility by the increase of their income. The fact that h′１＜
h＊０ means that M＜（１－R）qh＊０ is not enough for this positive in-
come effect to offset the negative effect on the return of the eq-
uity.
I have shown that the type１policy with M＜（１－R）qh＊０ cannot
Pareto improve the temporary welfare of traders at s１. As I ex-
plained in the previous section, this temporary welfare is illusion-
ary, since traders do not take their tax burden in the future pe-
riod into account. Now the reality must catch the traders in pe-
riod２. The government’s objective is to finance M from the bene-
ficiaries of the policy without making the payoff of any trader
worse than that before the implementation of the policy, at both
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s２ and s３. At s２, all traders saved from the bankruptcy is bankrupt
again, so that only the bond buyers at s０ can be taxed. If the gov-
ernment can identify h′１, the maximum amount that the govern-
ment can collect is h１×（１＋p
＊（１）
h＊０ －
１＋p（１）
h＊０ ）＋（h′１－h１）
１＋p＊（１）
h＊０ .
By a simple calculation using the market clearing condition of the
bond／promise with or without the policy, this amount is equal to
h′１
h＊１ M－（１－
h′１
h＊１）（１＋R）, which is surely less than M. More serious
problem for the government is that, since it does not know the
function q, there is no way that the government recognizes h′１.
The government therefore has no other way than taxing all bond
buyers at s１. Also, the government cannot know h１, since the origi-
nal equilibrium trading does not happen because of the implemen-
tation of the policy.４ Hence the government has no other choice
but taxing
M
h＊１ to each bond／promise buyer. By the market clear-
ing condition on the bond／promise, the payoff（utility） for a
bond／promise buyer after tax is１＋Rh＊１ . For a trader in［０, h１］, it is
less than the payoff without the policy, which is
１＋R
h１ , also by the
market clearing condition on the bond／promise. Traders in（h１,
h＊１］are better off since they avoid the bankruptcy.
４ After the implementation of the policy, the original equilibrium at s１ becomes
counter-factual, something that did not happen. Since the government does
not know q, it has no ability to calculate h１.
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At s３, the situation looks better since the government can levy
all payoffs of traders saved from the bankruptcy at s１. It amounts
to M× １－Rp＊（１）－R, which exceeds M. Hence the government can fi-
nance the policy from those saved by the policy and still leave
them positive payoffs. However, there are traders whose utilities
（payoffs）are made worse by the implementation of the policy.
These are traders in（h１, h＊０］. For those in（h＊１．h＊０］, this must be
the case since their conditional expected utility at s１ is lowered
and they are bankrupt at s２ regardless of the policy. For those in
（h１, h＊１］, the utility（payoff）at s３,１＋p
＊（１）
h＊０ , is less than that if
they bought the equity with leverage, which is less than that
without the policy. Hence their utility（payoff）is also decreased
by the policy. Beyond financing M, the government may try to
compensate for them at s３, but such an action requires a knowl-
edge of h１, which the government has no way of knowing. In par-
ticular, taking away all of the payoffs from traders in（h＊０ ,１］and
redistributing to them after subtracting M never works. There
are two reason for this. First, the total payoff available at s３ after
tax is the same as that without the policy（equal to２）, while pay-
offs to traders in other categories are either unchanged（for trad-
ers in（h＊０ ,１］, remaining bankrupt）or increased（for traders in
［０, h１］）. Secondly, the government cannot identify the trader
group（h１, h＊１］, so that there is no way for the government to re-
distribute to that group. So, at s３, the government can finance M
with those who would have been bankrupt and those who would
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have been buying the bond／promise at s１ still being improved, but
the victims of the policy, traders in（h１, h＊０］, cannot be fully saved,
and those in（h１, h＊１］are sure to be left being worse off. Over all,
the bond／promise buyers are victimized by the implementation of
the policy. The analysis is summarized in Figure２.
Case２: M＞－（１－R）qh
＊
０
As is shown before, h＊１＞－h
＊
０ .
Let’s consider the conditional expected utilities of traders at s１,
and compare them with those without policy. Let the trader h′１∈
（h１, h＊１）be defined as before by
qh′１
qh１
１＋p（１）
h＊０ ＝
１＋p＊（１）
h＊０ ,
or, equivalently, by qh′１＝qh１×
１＋R
１－R＋qh
＊
１
１＋R
１－R＋qh１
. Note that h′１ increases as
M increases. If h′１＜h＊０ , then conditional expected utilities of the
traders in（h′１, h＊０］are lowered by the policy. Hence the govern-
ment has an incentive to set M so large that h′１＞－h
＊
０ . A calculation
Figure２: Welfare effect of the small scale policy
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shows that, if the government sets M so that h′１＝h＊０ , then the
conditional expected utilities of all traders except h＊０ are im-
proved. Table２summarizes the result of this calculation.
Considering the necessity to finance later, the government does
not have any incentive to set M higher than the level consistent
with h′１＝h＊０ . I denote this level of M as M＊. An economic intuition
for the improvement is trivial. All traders in（h＊０ ,１］would have
been bankrupt if the policy M＊ was not implemented, so they are
improved just by getting positive incomes. All traders in（h１, h＊０］
are improved since the relatively large increase of their income
by the policy makes the expected payoff on the equity without
the policy unattractive.
I have shown that, with the policy M＊, the government can
achieve a strict Pareto improvement on the conditional expected
utilities of traders except h＊０ at s１. This improvement is illusionary
since the tax to finance the policy is ignored by the traders. Let’s
Table２: A comparison of expected utilities when M＞－（１－R）qh
＊
０
Trader Group
Security Holding
w.o. policy→w. policy
E.U. at s１
w. Policy
E.U. at s１
w.o. Policy
［０, h１］ Bond→Bond １＋p
＊（１）
h＊０
１＋p（１）
h＊０
（h１, h＊０］ Equity→Bond １＋p
＊（１）
h＊０
qh
qh１
１＋p（１）
h＊０
（h＊０ , h＊１］ Equity→Bond M１－h＊０ ０（bankrupt）
（h＊１ ,１］ Equity→Equity qhqh＊１
M
１－h＊０ ０（bankrupt）
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consider admissible tax schemes at each state in the period２and
check whether the traders can be still improved after tax or not.
I assume, again, that the government actually does not intend to
save those bankrupt at s１without the policy.
Note that, with the policy M＊, the government can identify
three trader groups in the table by observing the asset holdings.
The first group,［０, h＊０］, consists of the bond／promise buyers at
s０. The second group（h＊０ , h＊１］consists of traders who buy the eq-
uity at s０ but the bond／promise at s１. The third group,（h＊１ ,１］,
consisted of the equity buyers at s１. In each group, traders have
the same income at s１, so they also have the same payoff（utility）
at each state in the period２. I call these groups the pool ＃１, ＃２,
and ＃３, in the order I mentioned.
At s２, traders in the pool ＃３are bankrupt, so that only the pool
＃１and ＃２can be taxed. The maximum amount the government
can levy from the pool ＃２ is
h＊１－h＊０
１－h＊０ M
＊, which is less than M＊.
Since the government cannot distinguish a trader from others in
the same pool, it must levy
１
h＊０×
１－h＊１
１－h＊０ M
＊ from each trader in
the pool ＃１. This leaves a positive payoff to each trader in the
pool ＃１, which is calculated as
１＋R
h＊０ . For a trader in［０, h１］, this
payoff（utility）is worse than that without the policy,
１＋p（１）
h＊０ ,
since p（１）＞R. For a trader h in（h１, h＊０）, it is clearly better than
that without the policy,０. As a result, those buying the bond／
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promise regardless of the policy at s１ are victimized by the policy,
while those buying the equity without the policy at s１ are im-
proved after tax.５
At s３, the total payoff that traders in the pool ＃２ and ＃３ re-
ceive is
１－R
p＊（１）－R
１－h＊１
１－h＊０ M
＊＋
h＊１－h＊０
１－h＊０ M
＊. Since p＊（１）＜１, this to-
tal payoff exceeds M＊. Hence the government can finance M＊
only by taxing on the pool ＃２ and ＃３, leaving a positive payoff
for all of them.（For example, since the difference between the to-
tal payoff on pool ＃２and ＃３combined and M＊ isΔ≡１－p
＊（１）
p＊（１）－R×
１－h＊１
１－h＊０ M
＊＞０, the government can leave
Δ
１－h＊０ to each trader in
the pool ＃２ and pool ＃３, and take away all the rest by tax.）
Both would be bankrupt if the policy was not implemented, so the
economic welfare on them is improved. In the pool ＃１, the payoff
for each trader in［０, h１］is increased from１＋p（１）h＊ to
１＋p＊（１）
h＊ .
However, for each trader in（h１, h＊０］ the payoff must be de-
creased, since the total payoff after tax available at s３ is un-
changed from that without the policy（equal to２）, while all trad-
ers in other groups are better off. The government may wish to
save those in（h１, h＊０］, but it cannot since, having no way of know-
ing h１, it cannot distinguish them from others in the pool ＃１. To
５ It is possible for the government to leave a small positive payoff to those in
pool ＃３ and still be feasible to finance M＊. In this case, each trader in the
pool ＃１ is taxed more, so that the bond／promise buyers regardless of the
policy are hurt even more.
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save them, it must reward all traders in the pool ＃１, which re-
sults in increasing the already increased payoffs of those in［０,
h１］. With the total payoff after tax unchanged from that without
the policy, the resource is never enough to improve the intended
target, even if the government takes away entire payoff from the
pool ＃２and ＃３. Hence, at s３, those who would have been bank-
rupt and those who would have been buying the bond／promise at
s１ are better off, but those who would have been buying the eq-
uity at s１ are worse off.
Over all, in period２, those would have been buying the equity
without the policy are victimized if the state is“good”, while
those who would have been buying the bond／promise without the
policy are victimized if the state is“bad”. The analysis is summa-
rized in Figure３.
The result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition６．１Consider the model described, and assume that the govern-
Figure３: Welfare effect of the large scale policy
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ment implements a temporal credit−saving policy of the type１, M, at s１. If
M＜（１－R）qh＊０ , then traders in（h′１, h＊０］are strictly worse off at s１, those in
［０, h１］are strictly worse off after tax at s２, and those in（h１, h＊１］are strictly
worse off after tax at s３, where h′１ is the trader who achieves the same condi-
tional expected utility at s１ by buying the equity with leverage without the
policy and by buying the bond／promise with the policy. Otherwise, the gov-
ernment implements the policy M＊ for which h′１＝h＊０ . With this policy, all
traders are better off at s１, but, at s２, traders in［０, h１］are strictly worse off
after tax, while traders in（h１, h＊０］are better off after tax. At s３, traders in
（h１, h＊０］are strictly worse off after tax, while all other traders are strictly
better off after tax.
７ Evaluation of the Policy and a Satisfactory Action
As explained in the section４, the policies are evaluated in two crite-
ria:
１．Do they achieve a Pareto improvement of the allocation when
they are active？
２．Do they achieve a Pareto optimal allocation when they are ac-
tive？
Since the assurance of Pareto optimality requires the completeness
of the financial market in this model, and the temporal credit-saving
policy does not affect the span of the financial market, it fails on the
second criterion. The argument used in the end of section３can be ap-
plied to show that the equilibrium allocation with the policy is Pareto
suboptimal at s１.
For the type１policy M＊, a Pareto improving allocation is obtained
as follows. For traders in（h＊１ ,１］, allocate the same amount of the Ar-
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row security on s３ as that in the equilibrium. This uses up（１－R）out
of the total（２＋M）Arrow security on s３, and leaves（１＋R＋M）of
both Arrow securities to be allocated to traders in［０, h＊１］. Using
them, create（１＋R＋M）of the bond and distribute to traders in［０,
h＊１］so that each trader receives exactly the same income as that in
the equilibrium, if the price of the bond is normalized to１. Then, ob-
tain an equilibrium allocation of the economy in which the group［０,
h＊１］trades two Arrow securities. This equilibrium allocation improves
the allocation in the original equilibrium for this group.
The proposition ６．１ says that it also fails on the first criterion.
Hence the temporal credit-saving policy is not worth implementing,
though the type１ policy M＊ achieves an illusionary Pareto improve-
ment at the state the policy is implemented.
Then, what action should be implemented？ On the second criterion,
the answer is already given in Fostel and Geanakoplos（２０１１）. It is
enough to admit tranching on both the bond and the equity. As they
explain, this creates the Arrow security on the“bad”state in the
equilibrium, which can be sold by both bond holders and equity hold-
ers. The left-over after the tranching is the Arrow security on the
“good ”state, for both assets. Hence both bond holders and equity
holders can buy and sell all Arrow securities, making the financial
market complete.
The timing to introduce tranching is important on the first criterion.
The tranching on both the bond and the equity must be introduced
before trading occurs at s０.６ Since the action does not do anything af-
ter the period１, its welfare effect must be evaluated only in terms of
traders’expected utilities at s０. Since the trading in this model has not
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started yet there, it has no alternative case to be compared with.
Therefore it achieves both a Pareto improvement and a Pareto opti-
mal allocation.７ The appendix B in Kaneko（２０１１）analyzes what hap-
pens if the tranching on the bond and the equity is introduced at s１,
and proves that there exists a group of traders whose expected utili-
ties at s１ are worse off by such an action. This analysis becomes possi-
ble since the trading in this model has already started at s０, so that we
have a hypothetical equilibrium allocation to be compared with at s１.
There exists a trader h＊１＜h１, who is indifferent between holding the
Arrow security on s２ and holding that on s３. All traders in［０, h＊１）buy
the Arrow security on s２, while all traders in（h＊１ , h＊０］buy the Arrow
security on s３. Traders sufficiently close to h＊１ are worse off, while
those far from h＊１ can be better off. Especially, those in［h１, h＊０］are
better off since they are optimistic enough to bet on s３. There are vic-
tims in both group of traders, and they are“irresolute”when h＊１ is
sufficiently close to h１.８ But, when h＊１ is small, all buyers of the Arrow
security on s２ are worse off.
６ For the importance of timing to introduce tranche and／or CDS on a price
dynamics and a credit cycle, see Fostel and Geanakoplos（２０１１）.
７ Surviving the criteria I propose does not necessarily means that the realized
allocation looks reasonably moderate in a common sense. In this model, it is
quite opposite in the sense that we will see some bankrupt traders in every
state after the period１, even at“good”states. This is an unwanted conse-
quence of the assumption that all traders are risk-neutral. In the complete
market, all risk-neutral traders bet on the states which they give the highest
subjective probability. Therefore the casualty of bankruptcy is maximized in
the complete market. Replacing risk-neutral traders by risk-averse traders
may improve on that matter, but the price to pay is that the calculation of
the equilibrium allocation will be made far more difficult.
８ Those“irresolute”are victimized since they are invited into betting on a
state even if they are not so sure which state is likely to occur.
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In reality, all economic agents exist in the state at which trading in
the economy has started a long time ago. Hence the analysis in the ap-
pendix B of Kaneko（２０１１）would give some insight about what hap-
pens if the tranching on all securities is introduced at some point in
the real world. Especially it would imply that, if the authority who can
take an action does not have an ability to distinguish one agent from
another, there will be no fully satisfying action in terms of my criteria
in the real world, and only the Pareto optimality of an equilibrium allo-
cation will be achieved by the introduction of tranching on all securi-
ties.
The analysis given is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem ７．１ Consider the model described. The temporal credit-saving
policy of type１ fails on both of two criteria proposed. Introducing tranching
on both the bond and the equity at s０ before a trading occurs satisfies both
criteria. If it is introduced at s１, it fails on the first criterion but satisfies the
second criterion.
Some readers may think that, if the introduction of tranching at s１ is
reinforced by a proper policy by the government, it may bring a Pa-
reto improvement. The appendix C in Kaneko（２０１１）analyzes the
welfare effect of such an action, where the government transfers in-
come from the bond／promise holders at s１ to the equity holders at s１.
It shows that, if a condition is met, this reinforcement achieves a Pa-
reto improvement. However, the existence of the income transfer for
which this condition is satisfied depends on the function q. Even when
it exists, the government lacks an ability to calculate it since it has no
way of knowing q.
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８ Conclusion and Remarks for Further Study
The results in this article suggest strongly that the temporal credit-
saving policy of type１ is not worth taking. However, it might be if
two factors, which are left out of the scope in this article, are taken
into account. One is a positive real effect of the policy. The other is a
liquidity.
A positive real effect of a monetary policy, with a possible support
by an adequate fiscal policy, is believed to exist in some area of mac-
roeconomics. In the model of this article, it is embodied as an increase
in the payoff of the equity, since this payoff comes from the produc-
tion in the real sector of the economy. In the appendix A, I give an
analysis of the welfare effect of the type１ policy that has a positive
real effect. There, it is assumed that the type１policy M increases the
payoff at s２ byδM＞０. The real effectδ is assumed to be an increasing
continuous function of M, though the increased payoff（R＋δM）is al-
ways less than １, the payoff when the economy turns out to be
“good”. The analysis shows that, by sacrificing those who hold the eq-
uity regardless of the policy at s３,（１）the type１policy in a small scale
makes all traders better off in s１ and s２ if the real effect of the policy is
strong and q is moderately responsive to h positively around h１, and
（２）that in a large scale makes all traders better off at s１ and s２ if the
real effect can be made very strong. The efficacy of a small scale pol-
icy depends on a subtle relation between the strength of the real ef-
fect of the policy and the variety of trader types, so that it is hard to
be achieved by the government. The efficacy of a large scale policy
depends only on the strength of the real effect of the policy, so that
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the result may be seen as a theoretical evidence that a“massive”
money injection, such as a quantity easing policy with an inflation tar-
get, improves the welfare of traders if a bad turn of the economy is
highly expected in the real side of the market. However, this efficacy
is a consequence of a strong real effect of money, that is rarely ob-
served in empirical studies. Regarding the quantity easing policy in Ja-
pan, Chapter１０ in Umeda（２０１１）states that preliminary empirical re-
searches in BOJ find no conclusive evidence on a positive real effect of
the policy, and that has become a consensus among the members of
the Policy Board at BOJ. Arai（２０１２）finds that the small stock mar-
ket bubbled in the period that the quantity easing policy was pro-
longed, and such a price increase was highly correlated with the off-
shore money account, which is considered to capture the strength of
traders’expectation that the quantity easing policy will stay. These in-
dicate that it is highly unlikely that a strong positive real effect of a
temporal credit-saving policy exists.
It is hard to analyze the problem of liquidity in the model adopted
in this article, since it is a general equilibrium model so that all assets
are traded without any shortage of liquidity at s１. Note that BOJ now
emphasizes that the positive aspect of the quantity-easing policy was
to make the yield curve flatter by reducing the long-term interest
rate. The long-term commitment on the quantity-easing policy until
the rate of increase in the general price index becomes stabilized at
０％ achieved this by creating a market expectation that there would
be more than enough money supply in the future. Such an effect is
called as a“time-axis effect”. It is clear that this effect is a recovery of
liquidity on the long-term bonds. The３-period model used in this arti-
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cle has no way of distinguishing the long-rate from the short-rate, so
that this effect cannot be analyzed at the outset. To analyze such a li-
quidity issue on the bonds with different maturities, either the time-
horizon should be extended to incorporate bonds with longer terms or
a bond with a short maturity within a period should be introduced,
along with a device to incorporate a notion of liquidity.
Since a temporal credit-saving policy is implemented as a monetary
policy in reality, a monetary economics model may be more appropri-
ate if we want to focus on policy tools currently available for central
banks. In Dubey and Geanakoplos（２００１）, a neo-classical static mone-
tary economics model is proposed and the roles of a monetary policy
（injection of inside-money）and a fiscal policy（injection of outside-
money）are analyzed. The model is extended to２periods with uncer-
tainty in Dubey and Geanakoplos（２００３）, but the analysis of policies
are left unsolved. In general, a recovery of liquidity and a positive real
effect are not independent. For the models in these papers, a positive
real effect of a monetary policy can be brought only by easing liquid-
ity constraints, since such an effect comes from an increase of con-
sumption by easing the cash-advanced constraints of consumers
through the reduction of a borrowing cost. However, the experience of
Japan strongly suggests that the recovery of liquidity alone will not
be enough to bring a recovery of the real economy. It was mentioned
earlier that a time-axis effect of the quantity-easing policy had existed
clearly, but no positive real effect had been detected. Without a doubt,
an increase of consumers’income is crucial. In the case of Japan, it is
conceived that a shortage of liquidity had existed only in long-term
bonds, so that a positive effect on the consumption demand from a re-
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covery of their liquidity was limited to durables and novel goods in
the future which are expected to have high prices, and, as such, was
entirely offset by a negative perspective of diminishing income for a
long time. Also, the lowered long rate would have helped firms engag-
ing in a resource-consuming production of durables and developing a
new technology to produce novel goods, but the perspective of a
shortage in the demand prevented it to happen. Thus, the lack of an
adequate fiscal policy might have been a crucial mistake in the case of
Japan. By extending the time horizon to at least３ and introducing a
production into the model of Dubey and Geanakoplos（２００３）, all of
these may be explained.
The model has only two securities and risk neutral traders. It is too
limited to represent the complexity of the real world economy. How-
ever, admitting all shortcomings of the analysis in this article, the re-
sults obtained still help deducing a rough idea about the consequence
of a temporal credit-saving policy in reality.
For example, consider the problem of defaulting countries in EU.
The bonds issued by those defaulting countries is the equity Y in the
model. The bonds issued by non-defaulting countries is the bond X in
the model. Buying out the bonds of defaulting countries by ECB may
be viewed as a temporal credit-saving policy of type１. Note that the
action do not specify any financing plan in detail when it is imple-
mented. The proposition６．１gives the following prediction.
 If this buyout is small in scale, the safe bond holders discouraged
by higher prices of the bonds of defaulting countries are worse off
at the state where this buyout is performed, since the opportunity
cost from the lowered return on the risky bond is not fully compen-
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sated by the increase of their income.
 If this buyout is sufficiently large in scale, all traders are better
off at the state where this buyout is performed. However a group of
the safe bond holders are worse off in the future period. If the de-
faulting countries actually defaults, all traders who would also have
held the safe bond without the buyout are worse off by a heavy tax
burden. If the defaulting countries do not default, the safe bond
holders who are discouraged by the higher prices of the risky bond
are worse off since they have lost an opportunity to enjoy a decent
return from their successful investment.
If EU issues a unified EU bond, it is regarded as Y, and the U.S.
treasury bond and／or the Japanese treasury bond are regarded as X.
The buyout of the unified EU bond by IMF, an international rescue
fund etc. may be viewed as a temporal credit-saving policy of type１.
It is now easy to draw a similar prediction. In this case, U.S. treasury
bond holders worldwide and／or Japanese nationals will be victimized.
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Appendix
A A positive real effect of the type１policy
Here I assume that the type１policy M has a positive real effect in
the economy, so that it increases the payoff of the equity at s２ byδM.
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Thisδ is an increasing continuous function of M,δ０＝０, andδM＜１－R
for all M＞０. I also assume that the type１policy M has no real effect
at s３.
In the unique equilibrium, only the promise（R＋δM）is traded. The
marginal buyer of the equity, h＊１ , is determined by
qh＊１ ＝
p＊（１）－（R＋δM）
１－（R＋δM）
.
All traders in［０, h＊１］buy the bond／promise, while all traders in（h＊１ ,
１］buy the equity with leverage（R＋δM）.
The unknowns of the equilibrium are the marginal buyer h＊１ and
the equity price at s１, p＊（１）. Depending on whether h＊１＜h＊０ or not,
they are determined by the following system of equations.
When h＊１＜h＊０ :







p＊（１）＝h
＊
０
h＊１（１＋R＋δM＋M）－１,

qh＊１＝
１
１－（R＋δM）［（
h＊０－h＊１
h＊１ ）（１＋R＋δM）＋
h＊０
h＊１ M］.
When h＊１＞－h
＊
０ :







p＊（１）＝１－h
＊
１
１－h＊０ M＋（R＋δM）,

qh＊１＝
１－h＊１
１－h＊０
M
１－（R＋δM）
.
In both cases, the r.h.s. of the equation for qh＊１ is increasing with re-
spect to M and decreasing with respect to h＊１ . This implies that it has
at most one solution h＊１ for each M, and h＊１ increases as M increases.
Since h＊１＝h１ when M＝０, this implies that h＊１＞h１ for all M＞０. A sim-
ple calculation shows that p＊（１）is also increasing with respect to M.
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Here p＊（１）＞p（１）for M＞０.
From the system of equations, it can be easily shown that,
h＊１
＜
＝
＞
h＊０⇔M＋qh＊０δM
＜
＝
＞
qh＊０（１－R）.
Since the equilibrium system of equation differs depending on
whether h＊１＜h＊０ or not, I analyze two cases separately.
Case１: M＋qh＊０δM＜qh＊０（１－R）.
In this case, we have h１＜h＊１＜h＊０ .
First. consider the welfare effect at s１. As a comparison of ex-
pected utilities, we obtain exactly the same table as that with no
positive real effect. Traders in［０, h１］are better off since their in-
come is increased due to the increase of the equity price. Traders
in（h＊０ ,１］are also better off since they avoid bankruptcy. For
traders in（h＊１ , h＊０］, a calculation shows that they are better off if
and only if the following inequality is satisfied,
h＊１＞（１＋ M１＋R＋δM）（h１＋（h＊０－h１）
δM
１－R）. 
（It is calculated using （１＋p
＊（１）
h＊０ ）／qh＊１ ＝（１－（R＋δM））
１＋R＋δM＋M
（h＊０－h＊１）（１＋R＋δM）＋h＊０ M , and （
１＋p（１）
h＊０ ）／ qh１＝
１－R
h＊０－h１.）
Whether this inequality is satisfied or not depends on the proper-
ties of the functions q andδ. At least it requires that q is not very
responsive to h compared with the response ofδ to M in a rele-
vant range. For those in（h１, h＊１］, the expected utility with the
policy is the same for all of them, and that without the policy in-
creases with h. Hence, once the trader h＊１ is better off, then all of
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them are better off. The inequality（７）ensures that. I have
shown that, if the inequality（７）holds, then all traders are better
off by the policy at s１, though the improvement is illusionary since
the traders do not take the tax burden in the period２ into ac-
count.
Next, consider the welfare effect at s２. All traders in（h＊１ ,１］are
bankrupt. Traders in（h＊１ , h＊０］would be also bankrupt without
the policy. Traders in（h＊０ ,１］would be inactive without the pol-
icy. Hence these traders neither gain nor loose. After all securities
pay out, the government levies
M
h＊１ from each trader in［０, h
＊
１］.
This leaves a positive amount of payoff to each trader in［０, h＊１］,
which is
１＋R＋δM
h＊１ . All traders in（h１, h
＊
１］are better off since this
positive payoff is better than being bankrupt. For traders in［０,
h１］, the necessary and sufficient condition for that their payoff is
better than their payoff without policy,
１＋R
h１ , is
h＊１＜（１＋δM１＋R）h１. 	
Though h＊１＞h１ implies that their payoff is depreciated more with
the policy, the positive real effect of the policyδM may offset it.
Whether this condition is met or not depends on the functions q
andδ. It requires that the real positive effectδM is sufficiently
large in the relevant range of M.
Finally, consider the welfare effect at s３. Since the return on the
equity exceeds１ in this state, the government can finance the
An Evaluation of Temporal Credit-Saving Policies I
４８ （７０４）
policy by levying
M
１－h＊０ from each trader in（h
＊
０ ,１］, leaving a
positive payoff. Traders in［０, h１］are better off, since they hold
the bond／promise regardless of the policy, and p＊（１）＞p（１）. All
traders in（h＊１ , h＊０］hold the equity regardless of the policy, so
that, by the same argument as that at the state s１, they are better
off if and only if the inequality（７）is satisfied. All traders in（h１,
h＊１］receive an equal payoff１＋R＋δM＋Mh＊１ . They would be holding
the equity without the policy, so they would receive
１
qh１
１＋R
h１ .
Without a calculation. we know that they must be worse off by
the policy, since the total payoff at s３ after tax, which is２, is un-
changed and all traders other than those in（h１, h＊１］are better off.
Over all, the policy may improve all traders at s１ and s２, sacrific-
ing those who hold the equity regardless of the policy at s３, if and
only if the following condition is satisfied,
（１＋ M１＋R＋δM）（h１＋（h＊０－h１）
δM
１－R）＜h＊１＜（１＋
δM
１＋R）h１. 

The result looks encouraging at a glance, since it suggests a
possibility that the type１policy in a small scale may improve all
traders in states where the economy turns bad. However, we
should not be optimistic. The condition requires that the positive
real effect of the policy is sufficiently large on the specified range
of M in this case, and q is moderately responsive to h positively
around h１. Thus whether it is met or not is a subtle matter, since
a strong positive real effect of the policy alone does not guarantee
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the improvement. Also, the government can never be sure about
the improvement since it has no knowledge of q, and is also likely
to lack a knowledge ofδ.
Case２: M＋qh＊０δM＞－qh
＊
０（１－R）.
In this case, h＊１＞－h
＊
０ . The analysis is parallel to the one given in
the section６.
First, consider the welfare effect at s１. Traders in（h＊０ ,１］are
better off, since they receive a positive income with the policy,
which is better than being bankrupt. Traders in［０, h１］are better
off since they hold the bond／promise regardless of the policy and
their income is increased. For those in（h１, h＊０］, the argument pro-
ceeds just as that in the section６. Let h′１ be the trader who is in-
different between buying the equity without the policy and buy-
ing the bond with the policy. It is determined by qh′１＝（
１＋p＊（１）
１＋p（１））
×qh１, so that h′１＞h１. If h′１＜h＊０ , the traders in（h′１, h＊０］are worse
off. Hence the government must choose M for which h′１＞－h
＊
０ . Let
M be any level to achieve h′１＞－h
＊
０ . With this M, all traders in（h１,
h＊０］, possibly except h＊０ , are in the range less than h′１, so that they
are strictly better off.（The trader h＊０ may neither gain nor lose,
but is not worse off.）
Next, consider the welfare effect at s２. Traders in（h＊１ ,１］, who
would be inactive without the policy, are bankrupt. Hence pools
that the government can tax are［０, h＊０］and（h＊０ , h＊１］, which I
call the poll ＃１and ＃２ in order. The total payoff of the pool ＃２
is less than M, since this groups holds the bond／promise whose
return is１. The government takes away all of that by tax, which
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amounts to（h
＊
１－h＊０
１－h＊０ ）M. Traders in the pool ＃２, who would be in-
active without the policy, are therefore bankrupt. The govern-
ment must collect the rest from the pool ＃１, and it levies
１
h＊０
１－h＊１
１－h＊０ M from each trader in the pool ＃１. A simple calculation
shows that each trader in this pool has the payoff after tax equal
to
１＋R＋δM
h＊０ . Traders in（h１, h
＊
０］are better off since they would
be bankrupt without the policy. Each trader in［０, h１］would have
１＋R
h１ without the policy, and he is better off by the policy if and
only ifδM＞
h＊０－h１
h１ （１＋R）.
Finally, consider the welfare effect at s３. Each trader in（h＊１ ,１］
receives
１
qh＊１
M
１－h＊０ , which is larger than
M
１－h＊０ since the return on
the equity exceeds １. Since each trader in（h＊０ , h＊１］receives
M
１－h＊０ from the bond／promise, those who would be bankrupt at s１
without the policy has a total payoff more than M. Therefore the
government can levy M from traders in（h＊０ ,１］and still leave
positive payoffs to all of them. Traders in［０, h＊０］are not taxed,
and each receives
１
h＊０ ［
１－h＊１
１－h＊０ M＋（１＋R＋δM）］ from the bond／
promise. Traders in［０, h１］are better off since they hold the
bond／promise regardless of the policy and their income at s１ is in-
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creased by the policy. Since the total financial payoff after tax at
s３, which is２, is not changed by the policy, all traders in（h１, h＊０］
must be worse off. Since the payoff is equal for each trader in［０,
h＊０］, the policy of a larger scale may not reduce the welfare loss
of these traders.
In summary, the policy may improve all traders at s１ and s２,
sacrificing those who hold the equity regardless of the policy at s３,
if and only if the following inequality is satisfied,
δM＞
h＊０－h１
h１ （１＋R）. 
The inequality does not depend on h＊１ , so that it can be satisfied if
there is a strong positive real effect at a“large”M for which h′１＞－
h＊０ . The result looks encouraging, but again we must be cautious.
First,δM＜１－R no matter large M is, so that it may be impossible
to satisfy the inequality if its r.h.s. is more than or equal to（１－
R）. Secondly, the government is never sure about the scale of the
policy for the improvement at s１ and s２. There are two reasons for
this. One is that h１ is made counter-factual by the policy, so that
the government cannot know the value of the r.h.s. precisely. The
other is that the government is likely to lack the knowledge ofδ.
（Received: October２６,２０１２）
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Summary
An Evaluation of Temporal Credit-Saving Policies I
―Welfare Analysis in a Simple Financial Trading Model
with Heterogeneous Risk-Neutral Traders―
Fumihiro KANEKO
I show that a temporal credit-saving policy by which bankrupt trad-
ers obtain credits do not improve the economic welfare. The analysis
is based on a ３-period general equilibrium model with risk-neutral
traders, in which a bond and an equity are traded and an opportunity
for leverage is available. The implementation of the policy shifts the
equilibrium and the payment of the financial contract in the past is ad-
justed according to its content. This adjustment creates an illusion
that the policy improve the welfare of traders since the tax to finance
the policy is not foreseen. However, after the tax is levied in the final
period, in any state, a group of bond holders is worse off. The result-
ing allocation is Pareto suboptimal.
Key words: temporal credit-saving policy, quantity-easing policy, bank-
ruptcy, incomplete market, leverage.
JEL classification codes: D５２, D５３, D６１, G２８.
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